In the wake of the major international environmental conferences, a multidimensional model of "sustainable development" has been developed. This 
I. Introduction
In the context of the major international environmental conferences, participants have formulated a number of general principles of sustainable development, consisting of several dimensions that embrace economic, social and ecological aspects of long-term future responsibility. All societies and countries are urged to face these key challenges, including, for example, the protection of natural resources, the preservation of social cohesion under conditions of social change, 540 problems than one would assume. 7 In contrast, at least same autocracies seem to have fulfilled their commitments in regard to these challenges in similar or even better ways. However, no systematic-empirical examination of these interrelations has yet been presented.
This gap in research and knowledge is even more astonishing if we consider that doubts about the superiority of democracy have been well-documented in political theory. Thus, based on a debate on the "negligence of the future in democracies" 8 that reaches back at least as far as Tocqueville, 9 the question arises whether democracies are not, after all, ridden with particular difficulties integrating the interests of future generations in their political decision processes. This could be due to a democratic system's core premise of following the preferences and interests of those citizens who are alive today rather than at some future date.
In the following, based on the existing empirical research gap, we shall compare not only the current "sustainability performance" of democracies and autocracies in relevant policy areas, but also the specific "sustainability effect" of the several regime types in question. Thereby, the influence of the regime type on the sustainability rating is evaluated in comparison to the effect of other explanatory variables. 10 This analysis of the links between the discourses on the advantages of democracy and the questions of sustainable development is guided by the following questions:
Which results do today's democracies and autocracies achieve in regard to their sustainability ratings? Can systematic patterns of performance be detected in regard to regime subtypes?
Are these factors, if any, significant or are other variables more salient in explaining sustainability performance?
Before the effect of the degree of "democratisation" or "autocratisation" on the sustainability performance ratings can be determined by regression analyses, the target dimensions of sustainable development need to be discussed and opera-ZSE 4/2011 541 tionalised (II). This is followed by several hypotheses on the expected regime effects and the introduction of several control variables (III), leading to a presentation of the empirical findings (IV). These results are then subject to a systematic evaluation (V), leading to a short conclusion (VI).
II. Theoretical foundations 1. Sustainable development
Within the normatively charged debate on aspects of responsibility towards future generations, 11 of inter-generational justice, and of preparations for future contingencies, 12 a vast body of literature has been produced. 13 As early as 1987, the Brundtland Commission defined sustainable development as follows: "Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." 14 Since the Rio Summit of 1992, sustainable development no longer merely refers to the longterm protection of the environment and its natural resources, but also, in the sense of a "magic sustainability triangle", to the realisation of social and economic goals. Concerning both intra-and intergenerational justice, it constitutes a call for an expansion of political responsibility beyond those who are currently alive to also include future generations.
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The debate on the theoretical concept of sustainable development is extremely controversial. 16 Provided that sustainable development can be guaranteed by an optimal adaptation to the most important challenges, it appears logical that the identification of these challenges is central to a more detailed operationalisation of any concrete objectives. The evaluation of several Delphi surveys 17 permits us to conclude that the following key trends can be seen as "global challenges":
Increasing globalization and intensified international competition, processes of transformation from industrial to information societies, excessive burdens on public budgets due to the enlargement of state responsibilities, threats to natural resources by increased environmental pollution, and growing scarcity of natural resources by an increasing consumption.
In the early 21 st century, sustainable policies are characterised by the fact that states attempt to react to these future challenges. The importance attached to solving these challenges can be illustrated by pointing at a number of international agreements over the past few decades. In the context of the follow-up to the Rio Summit, not only were the general principles of a sustainable development established, but also there was an attempt to react to several ecological challenges by means of climate, biodiversity and forest conventions. 18 Highest priority was given to securing elementary levels of education as well as to the diminution of starvation and malnutrition, improved healthcare and increased life expectancies by means of the UN Millennium Goals. 19 Finally, apart from these objectives, numerous national sustainability strategies 20 refer to the importance of long-term budget consolidation and the promotion of scientific innovation and competitiveness as a reaction to globalisation and the transformation from the industrial to the information age.
If one were to compile a list of pivotal sustainability goals, it is justified, with regard to the economic dimension, to consider not only budget consolidation, but also a continuous stream of investment in public infrastructure and in innovative and competitive capacities (research and development promotion) as key objectives. In the context of social sustainability, the degree of equality of opportunity and participation for future generations plays a role, measured by the human
capital levels within a society in the context of the education systems provided. Furthermore, the life expectancy of children born today should be increased by appropriate measures of health protection. Finally, based on the ecological dimension of sustainability, climate and environmental protection and a reduction of resource consumption should be promoted.
In order to be able to measure the performance in these nine areas for all countries, one indicator was chosen for each objective and evaluated based on data from the year 2006 (Table 1) .
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Within the economic, social and ecological dimensions, the three performance indicators corresponding to one dimension were summarised in an aggregated index in order to be able to offer an overview for each sustainability dimension. To achieve this, the different base values of the single indicators were first ztransformed and thus standardised, and then aggregated in the respective index after corrections for direction and equal weighting. 
Regime type
Before considering the connection between sustainability and regime type, the independent variable (regime type) needs to be defined. One can think of a continuum of possible characteristics, with an ideal (stable) democracy at one end and a perfect autocratic (totalitarian) regime at the other. 22 However, which are constituent characteristics permitting any clear distinction between the two regime types? On the basis of which central aspects can democracies be distinguished from autocracies?
In contrast to a very broad definition of democracy as expressed by the "Gettysburg formula" ("Government of the people, by the people, and for the people") or in the concept of "embedded democracy", considering political and civil freedom as well as equality and control as constitutive characteristics of a democracy, 23 a very lean concept shall be used to distinguish between regimes. Based on Dahl's definition of democracy (public contestation and the right to participate), the existence of "contested elections" will be used as the central criterion for the distinction between democracy and autocracy. In order to classify a regime as democratic, both the executive and legislative branches have to be legitimised by means of relatively fair elections (meaning that the opposition must have a real chance to win). Three conditions thus need to be fulfilled: "1.) Ex ante uncertainty: the outcome of the election is not known before it takes place.
2.) Ex post irreversibility: the winner of the electoral contest actually takes office.
3.) Repeatability: elections that meet the first two criteria occur at regular and known intervals."
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Only if these conditions are fulfilled, one can speak of a democracy, whereas in all other cases, we assume to be dealing with autocracies. The advantage of this narrow definition, ignoring aspects such as the separation of powers or civil rights, is based on the fact that it examines central institutional and procedural regime characteristics, but does not include the policy dimension. 25 Based on this definition, it is possible to design a "lean indicator" appropriate for the analysis carried out in the following.
Meanwhile, there exists a multitude of surveys that can be referred to in order to obtain precise measurements of regime types. few political objectives (mostly in the economic area), leads to a situation that functional differentiation, which is important for an overall system development, is impaired. Repression und excessive political influence can overlap with functional logics (subsystem codes) of other subsystems (economy, society, culture). This can lead to significant frictions and an inefficient policy development. Such a problem is even aggravated by the dictator's dilemma as proposed by Wintrobe:
31 many autocracies depend on the massive use of repressive measures due to their low degree of input legitimisation, 32 leading to a distorted perception of reality by the political leadership over time, as the government is no longer supplied with reliable information by its subjects (insufficient political feedback loop). In the phase of policy implementation (at the very latest), this fact leads to systematically suboptimal results.
In the end, however, it can be stated from a system-theoretical perspective that, apart from the characteristic of the regime type, the sustainability performance of a country is influenced by the system environment 33 and here especially by general economic conditions. 34 Therefore, considering the stage of economic development and the resource base of a country as potential explanatory variables seems useful in the subsequent analysis.
Approaching the potential relationship between regime type and sustainability from the perspective of institution theory, aspects of rule transition, control and enforcement should be considered. Essentially, one can proceed from the assumption that stable and predictable institutional arrangements tend to facilitate a sustainable policy output that relies on a long-term stable framework. 35 Following I Miquel, 36 autocracies are particularly prone to significantly lower institutional stability in contrast to democracies. As opposed to the latter, they often 32 The degree of repression, however, can vary greatly from one authoritarian regime to another. In the following, it is assumed that especially military regimes use systematically these means.
33 Easton, D., op. cit., p. 32. face greater difficulties in organising a regulated transition to a new ruler without fundamental upheavals. The instabilities and ruptures provoked by these radical changes can be a heavy burden for any sustainable policy.
As a further institutional aspect, one must deal with the question of rule control. In this context, it can be argued that a lack of public control (as it exists in autocracies) can impede the sustainability of public policy over time. Even if we accept Olson's "stationary-bandit" hypothesis, 37 which states that the expectation of long periods of political reign in autocracies can lead to policies directed towards long-term objectives, the danger of degeneration in authoritarian systems latently persist due to a lack of effective oversight. In contrast to this, the transparent and publicly controlled decision-making processes in democracies guarantee their capacity to learn, adapt and correct errors. 38 This is true because deficiencies are publicly known (early warning systems) and the ruling elite is encouraged to seek out better policy solutions as a result of their accountability towards the citizenry.
With regard to enforcing political decisions, one can criticise democratic systems (in contrast to autocratic regimes) insofar as democracies usually have particular difficulties implementing unpleasant and unpopular reforms. It is hardly possible for them to govern without resistance due to a frequently large number of limitations to institutional power and a plethora of veto players, 39 whose number may vary according to the regime subtype. This can lead to lengthy and tough decision-making and negotiation processes, which can result in a lowest common denominator of all participating actors. 40 Thus, the system can fail to deliver an optimal problem solution.
Furthermore, the institutional approaches draw attention to the fact that -aside from the regime type -other factors, such as the regime age and the presence of a system of rule of law, could be important for a country's sustainability performance. Hence, corresponding explanatory variables as well as dummy variables for monarchical autocracies (controlled transition rule) and for military dictatorships (high repression inclination) are included in the following regression analyses.
If we concentrate on access to power as another policy-relevant aspect, the actorrelated rational choice approach by Bueno de Mesquita et al. 41 is appropriate as an explanatory model. Adherents to this concept believe that the opportunity to gain influence on political decisions in democracies is much wider than in autocracies. As the "selectorate" in democracies consists of all voting citizens, a government must satisfy the interests of broad segments of the population to a much greater extent in order to be able to form a "winning coalition" as a foundation of its rule. For autocratic rulers, who only have to consider the interests of a very small "winning coalition", usually consisting of major military figures, senior party delegates and/or economic elites, it is rational to provide private goods (preferential treatment of specific groups of the population). Democratic governments, however, need to offer a much larger amount of public goods with a high common welfare standard.
However, it is crucial for the question of the sustainability impact to what extent the interests of future generations are neglected by the current "selectorate". Such a consideration of interests seems feasible in democracies, especially if one can suppose that there exist distinct advantages for the majority of today's generation. The less this is true, 42 the less we should be able to observe any effect. In this context, an important intervening variable is the age structure of a society. 43 Thus, it will be considered as an independent variable in the following regression analysis.
Taking a closer look at the level of the policy process, one might identify the core problem of democratic regimes in regard to sustainable development. This core problem is caused by democracies' tendency to act in a near-sighted fashion. The permanent focus of a democratic government on the acute management of upcoming challenges under the pressure of a short-term electoral period, and The theory of competition by Besley and Kudamatsu 47 is also situated on the policy level. It assumes, however, that democracies are characterized by incentives to permanent policy optimisation due to the strong political competition within the democratic regime. Such incentives are missing in a consolidated autocracy so that incentives to develop long-term solutions are negatively affected. Strong involvement in international processes could be a functional equivalent of such a competitive pressure from the inside (increased competition from abroad). Thus, the transnational interconnectedness of a country (measured by the degree of openness of its economy) was chosen as a control variable for the following analysis. In view of the presented theories, the arguments for a superior sustainability performance of democratic regime prevail: high level of institutional stability, strong government control, widespread potential to consider most societal interests, increased error-correction and learning capability, strong competitive orientation. Notable counter-arguments, however, have been proposed: the possibility of political blockages, short-term political cycles, a fixation on the present. different regime subtypes might vary in their inclination towards repression/inclusion as well as in their institutional stability and their ability to reform. Whereas the potentially higher ability to reform combined with a lower density of veto players could assign advantages to the parliamentary system type over presidential regimes, the transition of power in monarchies, which tends to be regulated, should constitute a great advantage for these regimes over other subtypes of autocracy. Military dictatorships, on the other hand, which are based on repression and a relatively small "winning coalition", should be especially prone to meagre performance in the area of sustainable policy making. On the basis of these theoretical considerations, the following hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 1: In comparison to autocracies, democratic states are characterized by a better performance in all goal dimensions of sustainable development.
Hypothesis 2: Within each regime type, further systematic performance differences can be detected:
Hypothesis 2a: Within the spectrum of democratic states, parliamentary regimes achieve better results than semi-presidential and presidential regimes.
Hypothesis 2b: Within the spectrum of autocratic countries, monarchies achieve the best and military dictatorships the worst results.
Hypothesis 3: A positive regime effect in favour of the democratic countries is preserved in all goal dimensions after correcting for the influence of other explanatory variables (control variables).
IV. Comparison of Performance
If a mean comparison test between democracies and autocracies is conducted for the three sustainability dimensions and the nine single indicators chosen (cf .  Table 3 ), then, in general, it seems obvious that democracies attain higher results. However, a closer examination reveals clear differences according to the field of study and the regime subsystems. A great deviation from the general pattern of the superiority of democracy is notable in the first indicator (state indebtedness). The mean comparison test (Table 3 ; column 2) states that democracies do not achieve better results than other states. Instead, monarchies achieve a significant better result with an average of 49.19 per cent of the GDP deficit debt than the parliamentary (55.92% of GDP), the semi-presidential (54,74% of GDP) and the presidential democracies (65.27% of GDP). Their performance is only undercut significantly by the military dictatorship (102.06% of GDP) 50 .
Democracies perform somewhat better in the field of infrastructure quality when measured for the number of secure internet connections. Parliamentary democracies in particular (210.66 Internet servers per 1,000,000 people) perform well in comparison to autocratic subtypes (Table 3 , column 3). A similar situation exists in relation to research performance when measured by the number of articles produced per capita (Table 3 , column 4). In this case, a more detailed study of individual countries shows that the superiority of democratic regimes is largely caused by the effect of the group of OECD countries. 51 The overall index for 50 A detailed consideration of individual country results shows that autocracies with abundant natural resources (Kuwait, Russia or Saudi Arabia) outperform some weaker democracies (e.g. Belgium, Greece, Italy and Japan). However, some African developing countries have the highest levels of debt while most of the newly industrialising countries, led by China, achieve rather good results.
51 The impact of the stage of economic development is especially apparent in the fact that less developed democracies hardly achieve better results in regard to the two indicators than their autocratic counterparts, whereas economically developed autocracies, as, for example, Singapore, can achieve results clearly above the average. Monarchies achieve a better performance on average when examined for the social dimension of sustainability (Table 3 , column 9). 52 These results are based on relatively high rates of primary education (89.01% primary graduation rates for relevant age groups, Table 3 , column 6) and advanced education program completions (20.04% tertiary graduation rates for the relevant age groups, Table  3 , column 7). 53 With an average life expectancy of 73.14 years for newborns (Table 3 , column 8), monarchies approach the values attained by democratic regimes, which perform much better in almost all other social indicators.
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Results are more differentiated in the climate protection rating when measured by CO2 emissions per capita (Table 3 , column 10). In second place after the monarchies (that are usually rich in natural resources), parliamentary democracies are the greatest CO2 producers with an annual average of 7.31 metric tons per capita. Military dictatorships, on the other hand, emit relative small amounts (Table 3 , column 11) show significantly higher share of renewable energy in all democratic subsystems while monarchies demonstrate particularly poor performance in this field (1.56%). When examining the conservation of resources (measured by the GDP produced per consumed energy unit, Table 3 , column 12), results are similar. 56 In sum, democracies achieve significantly better overall environmental performance (Table 3 , column 13), especially considered against the clearly under-average results of monarchies.
Thus, with the exception of CO2 emissions and budget discipline, democracies considerably out-perform non-democracies. While parliamentary systems achieve better results than their counterparts, at least in the economic and social dimensions, monarchies fare marginally better than other autocratic regime subtypes. In contrast, the otherwise lagging military dictatorships achieve relatively good results with respect to environmental sustainability.
At this point, it is important to consider the noticeable differences in results between individual sustainability indicators. The distribution within a regime type, depending upon the indicator, can reveal very wide spectra. This shows that comparative averages alone are not sufficient in explaining performance results. Thus, it is useful to add a greater number of explanatory variables.
V. Regression analyses
The aggregated results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 4 . More detailed results are for the nine sustainability indicators analysed are documented in Table 5 (cf. Appendix).
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55 A closer look at the micro-level shows that apart from some developed industrial nations (Australia, Canada, USA), autocracies with abundant resources (Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia) or high levels of economic development (Singapore) are linked to high levels of greenhouse gas emissions.
56 A certain exception exists only concerning the military dictatorships, which achieve a performance slightly above the one of semi-presidential democracies (5.97% GDP produced per consumed energy unit).
In the tables, a regression model containing all the explanatory factors from Table 2 is included for each sustainability dimension and each performance indicator. As the number of countries included alternates slightly due to data restrictions depending on the respective regression model, all models were also employed for a core sample of countries for which all data points were available across all indicators in order to validate the results (adjustment of sample results). Although this caused certain shift concerning the size of the individual regime groups (the percentage of democracies increases and the percentage of autocracies decreases), the results presented are preserved in nearly all aspects. This is also the case for If we first consider economic sustainability (Table 4 ; column 2), it is evident that the regime type does not contribute significantly to an explanation. 58 However, a high level of economic development and a strong enforcement of the rule of law are key to a good performance result. This also proves true when looking at the individual indicators of infrastructure quality (Table 5 ; column 3) and research performance (Table 5 ; column 4). According to the results of the regression calculations, apart from a high level of economic development, legal certainty and long-run reliability (regime age) play an important role in the provision of the regression models calculated for the year of 1996. Therefore, more detailed presentations of these control exercises proved unnecessary.
58 In an overall model producing a convincing explanation (corrected R 2 = 0.73), the standardised partial regression coefficient of the regime type variable reaches a value of 0,02 and thus an only very small and in significant result in favor of democratic countries. The opportunities to participate in public decision-making seem to have no significant influence on the containment of public debt. 61 In a weak overall explanation model (Table 5 ; column 2), the only significant link can be found between a high level of economic development and high levels of public debt. 62 On the other hand, public debt decreases if a country has a huge number of energy resources at its disposal and thus is less dependent on energy imports.
Whereas the aforementioned institution and actor theories might have difficulties explaining the missing democracy effect on the economic level, considerations of system theory could be pivotal. The economic sustainability performance (outcome legitimisation) seems to be eminently important for the regime stability, especially in autocracies with weak input legitimisation. This fact might explain why, in contrast to numerous democracies, autocracies with particularly strong economic development drives (China, Russia or Singapore) show aboveaverage results.
However, the situation is different in regard to the dimension of social sustainability. A significantly positive "democracy effect" on the overall index can be detected (Table 4 ; column 2), 63 even if its explanatory power is, once more, weaker than that of the rule of law. A stable constitutional foundation seems to be very important for the provision of basic needs. This can be shown by the factors of primary school graduation quotas (Table 5 ; column 5) and the life expectancies of newborns (Table 5 ; column 7). In contrast to this, its importance in explaining the successes in the tertiary education sector (Table 5 ; column 6) decreases considerably. On the other hand, the demographic component does not only influence the overall index, but also all other included indicators of social sustainability. In this regard, aging societies seem to place particular emphasis on the socio-political development of their countries. While there exists a negative correlation between the economic stage of development and the social sustainability performance -when controlled for other factors -, the opposite seems to be the case regarding the presence of abundant natural resources.
In an attempt to explain the positive correlation between the degree of democratisation and the observed high levels of social sustainability, system-, institutionand actor-related arguments can be used. 64 Apart from the broad competence of considering interests across numerous social groups (larger "winning coalition"), a lower inclination to repression and a higher level of institutional stability might be the decisive arguments in favour of democratic systems.
An even clearer regime effect in the expected direction (cf. hypothesis 3) can be stated for the dimension of ecological sustainability. Its robustness cannot only be seen in a highly significant result in regard to the overall index (Table 4 , column 3), 65 but it is also indicated by each individual indicator. Thus, in the context of renewable energies (Table 5 ; column 9) and the efficient use of resources (Table 5 ; column 10), none of the other variables can contribute significantly to the explanation, illustrating the importance of democratisation in this regard. In the context of the first indicator (the level of CO2 emissions, Table 5 ; column 8), only the stage of economic development can be identified as a being of additional significance. While this factor is positively correlated with the expansion of renewable energies and to resource efficiency in a country (without reaching a significant level), it seems that economic performance and climate pollution are still correlated.
Considering the theoretical foundations, it seems reasonable that the clearly positive correlation between the degree of democratisation and ecological sustainability is linked, first, to factors covered by system theory (facilitation of functional differentiation in the young field of environmental policy, sensitive feed-back loop in regard to new environmental problems) and, second, to institutional and actor specific factors. transparency of public processes in democracies might increase the ability to correct errors and thus make it easier to react appropriately to ecological problems. Furthermore, the inclusion of different interests and the political rights of freedom and participation open up vast opportunities to environmental pressure groups. Autocracies, in contrast, face a structural deficit in this regard.
VI. Conclusion
In summary, democracies generally achieve higher degrees of sustainability performance than autocratic regimes. A detailed comparison, however, shows that they are not always superior; democracies underperform particularly in the field of financial consolidation. In addition, the superiority of democracies in infrastructure, research and education is caused only by a relatively small group of advanced OECD countries. Beyond this, the assumption of a general superiority of democracies as formulated in hypothesis 1 cannot be confirmed due to sporadic deficits in the ecological sustainability rating.
Similarly, the assumed performance differences between regime subtypes (hypothesis 2) are, in part, greater than the dichotomies between democracy and autocracy. As predicted by theory and explained by varying veto structures, small advantages of parliamentary democracies over presidential democracies can be found within the spectrum of democratic countries. The expected wide performance variation between "successful" monarchies on the one hand and poorly performing military dictatorships on the other hand is particularly visible in the realms of economic and social sustainability.
Hypothesis 3 proposes the expectation that democratic regimes should enjoy higher sustainability levels even when controlled for other explanatory factors. However, this expectation can only be confirmed in the dimension of environmental sustainability (climate protection, environmental protection and conservation of resources) and, to a lesser degree, in the dimension of social sustainability (increase in life expectancy). While we can observe a "democracy effect" in the "softer" fields (such as social sustainability, environmental protection, etc.), this effect plays no role in the field of economic performance. The results suggest that autocratic regimes use their significant political capacity to optimise the performance in those areas of economic and social development that are key to their regime stability (outcome legitimisation). Reflecting on the environmental dimension, it seems that the capacity of democracies to satisfy many different interest groups (large winning coalitions) and to achieve a high error correction as a result to higher levels of transparency leads to a performance advantage.
The analyses show that we cannot observe a secular "regime effect" across all fields. In part, economic factors (such as the degree of economic development and the wealth of natural resources) play a role. Another important determinant is the stage of development of a regime's constitutional institutions. It seems that an established system based on the rule of law is much more successful in laying the foundations for the satisfaction of basic economic and social needs than "authentic democratic participation". Along with regime age, the societal age structure also plays an important role, especially regarding social development.
In conclusion, the analysis of several aspects of sustainability presents a rather differentiated picture that this contribution could not map in all its facets. This suggests a necessity of further research to explore not only the theoretical connection between regime type and sustainability in greater detail, but also to analyse the differences between regimes and regime subtypes. In addition to the analysis of further significant explanatory factors of sustainable development (cultural factors, geographic settings, specific actor constellations), research focused on dynamic processes could prove fruitful in this relatively new field of study. 
VII. Appendix
Note: One asterisk (*) represents a significance of 90%, two asterisks (**) of 95% and three asterisks (***) of 99%. In the left field, the partial regression coefficient is recorded together with (in parentheses) the relative standard error. The right field contains the standardized partial regression coefficient. 
